Once humans invented successful flying machines, it was an easy step to put cameras in these machines so that the bird's eye perspective of the Earth could be revealed to those on the ground. From cameras on kites, balloons, and aircraft to electronic sensors on aircraft and satellite platforms, remote sensing has fundamentally changed the way we inventory, manage, and monitor resources, respond to disasters, and conduct war.
Introduction
Once humans invented successful flying machines, it was an easy step to put cameras in these machines so that the bird's eye perspective of the Earth could be revealed to those on the ground. From cameras on kites, balloons, and aircraft to electronic sensors on aircraft and satellite platforms, remote sensing has fundamentally changed the way we inventory, manage, and monitor resources, respond to disasters, and conduct war.
The Landsat Mission
Perhaps the most successful satellite remote sensing program dedicated to land observations has been the Landsat program (Lauer et al., 1997) . Born of civilian rather than military needs, the Landsat family of satellites has provided humanity with 34 years of standardized, moderate spatial resolution, multispectral images of the world. No other data sets allow us to assess the human condition so effectively. No other data sets can match Landsat's comprehensive record of the Earth and its resources. Yet, no other program has weathered the long-term political turmoil undergone by the Landsat Program.
This paper examines the political and economic history of the Landsat program by reviewing the history of the program within the larger context of market and political forces impacting civilian and military adoption of satellite remote sensing technologies. The factors are then assessed within the context of program adoption and commercialization.
Background
At the conclusion of World War II, the first image of Earth from space was taken from a captured V-2 rocket in 1949. As
Landsat in Context: The Land Remote
Sensing Business Model Kass Green the U.S. space missions evolved, a natural partition occurred between satellite sensors based on spatial resolution.
Sensor Spatial Resolution
Spatial resolution is a function of the capability of the sensor and the altitude of the platform. It is defined by the ground size of the smallest picture element or "pixel" captured by the remote sensing system. High spatial resolution systems capture more detail than low resolution systems. There are no hard and fast definitions of low, moderate, and high spatial resolutions but an example definition would be:
• Low spatial resolution: 120 meters or greater • Moderate spatial resolution: 10 to 119 meters • High spatial resolution systems: less than 10 meters.
Primary Applications
Low spatial resolution satellite sensors are typically used for weather forecasting and high resolution satellite systems are typically used for reconnaissance. While the demand for both originated with the military, access to the high resolution data was confined to the military for almost 40 years, while the weather data were immediately made accessible to the public. Conversely, moderate resolution systems typically were developed for resource management. The requirements for the moderate resolution systems arose from civilian researchers, with major military uses evolving in the last two decades.
U.S. Satellite System Development Low Resolution Systems
Knowledge of weather is important for human survival, and the gathering of data about weather has been supported by national governments for hundreds of years. Like reconnaissance, the management of weather data collection started in the military because of the strong impact weather has upon the conduct of war. U.S. military weather reporting began in the early 19 th century. In 1960, the first low resolution weather satellite (named TIROS for Television and Infrared Observation Satellite) was launched. Soon after, the military determined that it needed a separate weather satellite system to support the strategic needs of the CORONA high resolution reconnaissance program (launched 4 months after TIROS under the name Discover). They established the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) which launched its first of multiple satellites in 1962.
NOAA Weather Satellites
In 1970, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was established to operate all civilian weather satellites. However, in 1994, the management of U.S. weather satellites came full circle with the creation of the National Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), which is a dual purpose program servicing both civilian and military needs by merging NOAA's Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) with the military's DMSP (White House, 1994b) .
Weather Satellite Data Model
The high cost of building and launching weather satellites, coupled with the overwhelming public (military and civilian) need for weather data, resulted in the building, launching, and management of low resolution weather satellites remaining in the government's hands. Weather data are a public good, which the government decrees should be provided to the public at minimal or no cost to the user. However, the use of the imagery and information derived from weather satellites has quickly spread to other sectors as the imagery became ubiquitous, appearing on our televisions and now our computers continuously. By the late 1990s, governmentprocured and disseminated satellite weather information provided the basis for a $200 to $250 million a year commercial industry (Weiss and Backlund, 1997) . While the satellites have not been commercialized, the data from them has.
High Resolution Systems
The requirement for high resolution reconnaissance satellite imagery developed because of the need to capture detailed images of areas where aircraft could not safely fly (a.k.a., Gary Powers and the U-2). During the Cold War, spy satellites were pivotal sources of information for reconnaissance and treaty verification. Understandably, the technology to create, launch and operate high resolution satellite systems is considered an important national asset, protected by the highest levels of security classification.
Post Cold War Satellite Reconnaissance Industry
By the end of the Cold War, the large U.S. aerospace corporations became concerned that the need for their technology would become obsolete for reconnaissance purposes and that government expenditure for reconnaissance missions would be greatly reduced (Jones, 2004) .
In the early 1990s, Congress passed the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act (Public Law 102-555) which authorized the development of commercial remote sensing satellite systems and directed the Department of Commerce to regulate and license private sector parties to operate commercial systems.
Buoyed by market studies predicting a huge and fast growing market for remotely sensed data (Plate 1), U.S. aerospace corporations petitioned the administration to permit the commercialization of some of the technologies developed for reconnaissance missions (Jones, 2004 . .". The directive is a compromise between a desire to have the U.S. dominate the commercial remote sensing market, the hope that the dominance would allow the U.S. to control the proliferation of remote sensing technologies, and the national security requirement of maintaining some sort of control over the collection and distribution of high resolution imagery.
High Resolution Commercial Market
To date, over 30 licenses to build, launch and operate commercial high resolution satellites have been granted, but only two U.S. companies, GeoEye and Digital Globe, are actually operating high resolution commercial systems. Unfortunately, the civilian market for high resolution satellite imagery has not developed as projected. Plate 1 compares early remote sensing market projections with those performed in 2002 and 2003, almost a decade after the heady days of the early 1990s. Not only is the 2004 remote sensing market currently estimated to be less than fifty percent of 1995 projections for 2004 (from $7 billion to $2.9 billion), but the projected rate of increase (indicated by the slope of the lines) has fallen precipitously from estimates of 19 to 21 percent per year (KPMG, 1992) to as low as 3.9 percent per year (Schutzberg, 2004) .
Strong and growing competitors to the satellite high resolution systems are airborne systems. These have significant advantages including relatively low fixed costs, higher spatial resolution, better response times, comparable spectral resolution, no clouds, and few data use restrictions. All of these advantages combine to make commercial airborne data of higher value than high resolution commercial satellite data particularly in areas like North American and Europe, where a highly competitive airborne industry's access to air is minimally restricted by governments. Understandably, the demand for commercial satellite imagery tends to be focused in areas where commercial airborne systems do not operate (e.g., Iraq, North Korea, etc.) and from customers who are not particularly interested in sharing their data with a wide variety of users (e.g., the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA). If an airplane can gain access, airborne imagery products will usually out-compete high resolution satellite products as they are currently offered.
Commercial High Resolution Satellite Data Model
Smaller than expected market size, lower rates of market growth, and the non-competitiveness of satellite imagery products in much of the world have stagnated the ability of the commercial satellite companies to truly commercialize, that is, to be financially solvent without significant reliance on huge U.S. military expenditures.
However, because high resolution imagery from the commercial satellites has become increasingly important to the military and because the U.S. government believes that our national security would be threatened by a loss of U.S. dominance in this industry, President G. Bush released the U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy in 2003 (White House, 2003) which includes a directive that the U.S. government will "rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filling imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, and civil users . . ."
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) recently assisted in the 2003 policy implementation with two programs, ClearView and NextView. ClearView provides for NGA acquisition of commercial imagery to meet a portion of their mapping requirements. NGA has two ClearView contracts, one with Space Imaging (recently purchased by OrbImage to create the combined firm of GeoEye) and one with Digital Globe at $120 and $72 million, respectively (Clark, 2004) . The NextView program represents more of a government-private partnership by providing long-term government commitments to purchase imagery from the next generation of commercial high resolution systems. In exchange, NGA receives greater control over access and priority of satellite tasking and the ability to influence the design of the new systems. Two NextView contracts have been awarded, one to Digital Globe and one to OrbImage (now GeoEye) at approximately $500 million each over a span of five years. While these two contracts will hopefully provide a strong enough base to keep both Digital Globe and GeoEye financially viable, they will also result in increased influence of the military over the operations of these commercial companies, thereby blurring the line between military and commercial high resolution satellite operations.
Moderate Resolution Systems (Landsat)
The requirement for moderate resolution earth observing satellites was relatively slow to start, and, significantly, was not generated by the military.
1 In fact, the moderate spatial resolution of the Landsat systems was partially established to meet the U.S. military constraint that civilian satellite systems not present a security risk. Nevertheless, the 34-year Landsat program has been overwhelmingly successful. Landsat imagery are used for multiple applications such as forest and agricultural monitoring, disaster planning and response, tax compliance, water management, mineral exploration, endangered species habitat identification, and famine relief, among others. As stated by Dr. Marburger, the President's Science Advisor in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), "Landsat is a national asset, and its data have made -continue to make -important contributions to U.S. economic, environmental, and national security interests" (Marburger, 2004) .
Early Adoption of Landsat Imagery
Adoption of Landsat imagery was slow at first. The resolution of the imagery from Landsats 1, 2, and 3 was too coarse for many applications, and while the multispectral character of the data facilitated automated image classification, few people knew how or had computers powerful enough to conduct it. Adoption increased with the improved spatial resolution of the Thematic Mapper-class sensors (from 80 to 30 meters) and incorporation of geographic information systems (GIS) into image classification allowing for the integration of context and location into image classification. Other factors that increased user adoption included development of exponentially faster computers with larger hard drives and memory, computer algorithms that increased the The military opposed the concept and argued instead that it would be politically and economically better if civilian remote sensing was accomplished with aircraft rather than satellites.
accuracy of terrain correction and imagery registration, and development of robust image classification software. Finally, the first Gulf War brought moderate resolution imagery (both the French Système Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre (SPOT) and Landsat) into the public's homes every evening on the news as the media used the imagery to illustrate the progress of the war.
Strategic Landsat Use
Over the last 15 years, the military use of Landsat has also increased. At the end of the Cold War, few could visualize the unstable world we live in today, with terrorist attacks occurring at locations throughout the world. The need for reconnaissance has not diminished as projected, but has greatly changed. Instead of focusing on specific sites in one or two large countries (USSR and China), reconnaissance must now be dispersed around the world, and new technologies are required. Since Desert Storm, the military has recognized the usefulness of moderate resolution data to provide a wide synoptic view. In 1998 NASA contracted with Earthsat to create a world wide mosaic of Landsat imagery (called GeoCover) (Tucker et al., 2004) . NGA followed this program by partially funding the development of Geocover LC, which is a land-cover and land-use map that Earthsat created from the GeoCover imagery. As a result, the military has become one of the biggest users of Landsat imagery.
Landsat Privatization
Even though the Landsat Program has been highly successful, it has been plagued by a lack of institutional support. Over its 34-year history, the responsibility for the Landsat Program has been shifted from one organization to another at least five times.
In 1979, President Carter shifted operation of the Landsat Program from NASA to NOAA and issued Presidential Directive PD-54 (White House, 1979) which stated that the goal of the federal government was "eventual operation of these activities by the private sector" 2 . Five years later, President Reagan supported and the Congress passed the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 (PL 98-365) which directed NOAA to migrate the Landsat Program from the federal government to the private sector. Subsequently a competition was held and EOSAT, a joint venture of Hughes and General Electric, won the right to market, distribute, and sell data from Landsats 4 and 5 with the government (NOAA) still bearing the operational costs of managing the satellites. The contract provided EOSAT with the income from data sales, as well as from ground station operations worldwide. EOSAT was to assume operational costs once the government-funded Landsat-6 was launched.
To fund the commercialization of Landsat, EOSAT increased the price of a Landsat scene from approximately $300 per scene to over $5,000 per scene, which outraged most users (at that time mostly academicians and civilian agencies). EOSAT also prohibited redistribution of the data, by selling a restricted license to use the data rather than selling the data itself.
Return to Government Management
Over the next seven years the Landsat program remained a political football, tossed back and forth by NOAA, EOSAT, the Administration, and Congress (Florini and Dehganzda, 1999) . Finally after much review, Congress passed the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act (Public Law 102-555) which ended Landsat commercialization by designating that Landsat-7 would be taken back into the Federal government and managed by a partnership of NASA and DOD with the data distributed to all users at the cost of fulfilling user requests (COFUR). EOSAT retained the right to sell and distribute data from Landsats 4 and 5, and Landsat-6 after it launched. The timing of the legislative action to return control back to the Federal government immediately following Desert Storm should not be overlooked.
Within a year, the program again was in flux with the failure of Landsat-6 immediately after launch and by DOD's withdrawal of support for the program This coincided with the fall of the Berlin wall and the concomitant reduction of DOD's budget. In 1994 President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 3 (White House, 1994a) which gave NASA responsibility for developing and launching, and NOAA responsibility for operating Landsat-7. Four years later, NOAA's responsibilities were transferred to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
Landsat-7
Landsat-7 was successfully launched in April of 1999. The government set the price of a scene at $600 which they determined to be COFUR. The lower price of Landsat-7 imagery forced EOSAT (by then owned by Space Imaging) to match the price on their sales of data from Landsats 4 and 5. Additionally, the government lowered the ground station fees for downlinks from Landsat-7, which led many ground stations to abandon the much more expensive Landsat-5 ground stations. Unable to run Landsats 4 and 5 profitably, Space Imaging returned their rights to distribute imagery from the satellites to the government in 2002.
Landsat-7 was a phenomenal success. The combination of low price, easy access, international coverage, and no licensing restrictions coupled with the continually growing demand for information about land-use and land-cover change spurred the adoption of the imagery in operational programs across both the government and private sectors. Sales of Landsat data by the U.S. government jumped from just over $4 million in fiscal year 1999 to $11 million in 2002 (USGS, 2003 In fact, President Carter's suggestion was to commercialize all civilian earth observing satellite programs (including the weather satellites) by transferring them from the government to the private sector. In March of 1983 the Reagan Administration moved forward with the transfer of both programs. However, Congressional opposition stopped the transfer of the weather satellites.
to proceed without Landsat, and for NASA to build and launch a Landsat follow-on mission which will be operated by USGS (Marburger, 2005) .
The December Marburger memo also dictated that ". . . the National Science and Technology Council, in coordination with NASA, DOE/USGS, and other agencies and EOP offices as appropriate, will lead an effort to develop a long-term plan to achieve technical, financial, and managerial stability for operational land imaging . . ." In other words, the White House directed the agencies to determine how to migrate moderate resolution earth remote sensing from a satellite by satellite approach into a long term operational program, thereby raising the commitment to the future of moderate resolution land remote sensing to the highest levels. The resulting White House-led Future Land Imaging Inter-agency Working Group (FLI-IWG) includes multiple federal agencies whose goal is to: 
Current Landsat Status
Landsat-5 is now a very old system which will likely completely cease operations soon as its fuel diminishes. Furthermore, it lost its ability to download data outside of ground station communication cones over 10 years ago. As a result Landsat-5 imagery cannot be captured over areas such as Russia or central Africa that do not have Landsat ground receiving stations. Landsat-7 imagery is seriously compromised, and unusable for many applications. For many users the gap in Landsat data exists now. Whether or not the gap in Landsat continuity worsens dramatically depends on how long Landsat-5 and Landsat-7 continue to operate; how fast the follow-on mission is contracted, built and launched; and if the launch and deployment of the satellite are successful. However, there are some signs that the institutional chaos surrounding Landsat may be greatly reduced in the future. For the first time a federal agency, the Department of Interior, has stepped forward and offered to assume financial and organizational responsibility for U.S. land imaging programs such as Landsat and its follow-ons. In a letter to Dr. Marburger, the Department stated that it "stands ready to . . . assume leadership for the Nation's civilian operational land-imaging program" (Cason, 2006) .
Summary of Landsat Experience
In summary, the innovators of Landsat imagery were scientists and the early adopters were also scientists. The majority of users have been scientists and civilian agency personnel. Only recently has the user base expanded and included the military and some commercial users. Advances in computers and software coupled with the price reductions and the elimination of licensing restrictions following the launch of Landsat-7 have allowed organizations to incorporate Landsat data into their day-to-day operations. NASA, DOD, USGS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, NOAA, Bureau of Land Management, Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the United Nations, Ducks Unlimited, and more than half of the fifty U.S. states all rely on information derived from Landsat data on a daily basis. In addition, several private companies, such as Google and the Insurance Services Office (ISO: see http://www.iso.com/products/2400/prod2471.html for more information) routinely use Landsat data to produce commercial products.
The current gap in Landsat coverage is severely inhibiting our ability to map resources and monitor change around the globe. In addition, the United States may lose its leadership in global moderate resolution imaging to other countries with the result of the cost of moderate resolution imagery probably once again increasing significantly, thereby thwarting any hopes of the U.S. finally developing a vibrant value-added market, similar to that which currently exists for weather imagery and Global Positioning System (GPS) data. In addition, both commercial and civilian organizations will either curtail programs utilizing moderate resolution imagery, or purchase the imagery from other countries, moving this source of revenue off-shore.
Land Remote Sensing as a Public Good
The U.S. experience over the last half-century in land remote sensing all points to the fact that these observations are of critical value and cannot be supplied as a by-product of typical commercial enterprise in this country. At a simple level, the hurdles for public provision of a good include:
• The inability of the private market to produce the good at efficient quantities and pricing;
• The desire by the public (expressed in votes in local, state, and national elections) that the good be produced by the government in the absence of private provision; and
• The desire by the government to produce the good.
Inability of the Private Market to Produce the Good at Efficient Quantities and Pricing
Remote sensing technology adoption and commercialization are highly influenced by the fixed costs of the platform and the strength of the demand for the imagery. Commercialization is successful only when fixed costs are relatively low (as compared to competing goods) and/or demand is broad and deep. Thus, the production of airborne-collected digital orthophotos is a highly successful and competitive commercial business because the demand arises from multiple applications and the fixed cost of airplane operation is relatively low when compared to building and launching a satellite.
If there was a commercial market of the size required to support the design, construction, launch, operation, and archiving of moderate resolution satellite data, then the commercial sector would be providing the data, and there would be no role for the government in the provision of moderate resolution data. However, because of high fixed costs, commercial land satellite remote sensing at any resolution is not, and will not soon be, a viable non-military commercial venture. The requirements of commercial or government civilian users cannot support the investment necessary to build, launch, and operate an earth observing satellite.
The Public Desires that the Good be Produced by the Government When fixed costs are too high or the demand is too shallow and narrow to attract commercial investment, the government must decide whether or not the cost of the investment is exceeded by the perceived public benefits. In the case of high and low resolution systems, the U.S. government has clearly made the commitment to subsidize data acquisition either through government-run systems (the weather satellites) or through government-commercial partnerships (the high resolution commercial systems). The funding exists because Congress and the Administration believe that the public benefits derived from the data outweigh the costs of acquisition. Both the reconnaissance and the weather satellites are needed by the military which provides a deep well of support. In addition, weather satellites also enjoy a broad base of end user support, which is why two parallel weather programs (military and civilian) were funded for forty-plus years. Finally, unlike high resolution image acquisition over developed countries, few alternatives exist for satellite reconnaissance information over warring countries or for satellite weather data over large regions of the world.
In contrast, Landsat's base of support has been shallow, narrow, and fragmented. The user base was initially made up of scientists and the difficulty of working with the data slowed its adoption for many years. Then, seven years of illconceived "commercialization" resulted in Landsat prices and licensing terms which stagnated the adoption of the imagery. Without a strong user base, the institutional framework supporting Landsat has been weak from the beginning. The program has bounced from one agency to another every five to eight years. It has only been since the launch of Landsat-7 in April 1999 that the use of Landsat data has broadened widely to embrace many sectors including the military; and it is ironic that it is now that the Program's future is again at risk. Be it food security, disaster preparedness, urban planning, endangered species protection, water quality, or battle field situational analysis, the uses of Landsat data, and particularly Landsat in combination with high resolution data, have exploded and the user base is becoming politically motivated.
The Government Desires to Produce the Good Military requirements drive much of the innovation and adoption of remote sensing. However, military strategic needs have also constricted the release of remote sensing technologies into civilian and commercial markets. The technology to procure high resolution imagery from space has been available to the U.S. military for at least four decades, but available to civilian users for only the last five years. The world we live in today, with abundant and minimally restricted access to high resolution imagery worldwide, is relatively new and somewhat threatening to defense and intelligence organizations. Given the roots of remote sensing technology in the requirements of the military, it is perhaps surprising that the technology has been allowed to migrate to civilian markets at all. This nation's fundamental belief in democracy and capitalism and in the transparency upon which both are based, will always create tension between the desire to conceal covert activities while simultaneously promoting open information exchange.
Conclusions
Like high and low resolution satellite data, moderate resolution imagery is a public good whose provision/ acquisition must be the responsibility of the government sector. While commercial ventures will surely benefit from the public provision of moderate resolution satellite data (as the weather and GPS value-added industries have), they are merely spin-offs, and not a reason to fund the program.
A program for the provision of moderate resolution Landsat-like imagery must be funded by the government because the public needs it: both the people of the United States and our global community. Therefore, it should be jointly supported by the U.S. taxpayer and our international partners.
To expend our resources on global issues, we must know that the information is timely, objective, reliable, and consistent, and we must ask ourselves:
• Can our food security rely on information gathered by our nation's biggest agricultural competitors?
• Can our homeland security and defense depend on other governments' monitoring of economic and environmental change worldwide?
• Can our disaster response rely on the availability and timeliness of satellites controlled by other governments?
• Are we willing to turn over leadership in remote sensing to the rest of the world?
The American public and the global community need moderate resolution multi-spectral land remote imagery for environmental security, homeland security, and food security. It is a public need, and must be provided as a public good.
